Paul Samuelson's Historiography: More Wag Than Whig
thought both was and should be connected to intellectual history more generally. At the same time Robert Heilbroner began his paper by stating that "the history of economic thought is not in very high esteem these days. Few universities include it as a prescribed portion of the standard training curriculum for budding economists" (134), a claim that echoed Filipo Ceserano's that "It is a widely held opinion among economists that the history of the subject is of little relevance to the present day scholar. This opinion is reflected in the sharp decline of interest in the history of economics" (63).
The thirteenth contribution to Blaug's volume was Paul A. Samuelson's provocative essay "Out of the Closet: A Program for the Whig History of Economic Science". Reprinted from the History of Economics Bulletin (1987) , the predecessor of the Journal of the History of Economic Thought, it had been given as the Keynote Address to the History of Economics Society at its meeting in Boston on June 20, 1987. Samuelson responded to the worries of historians of economics by outlining a strategy for recapturing the interest of economists in the history of economic thought. Quite simply, historians should write for the audience of economists, not historians. He believed that such an approach was a natural one since all of economics analysis, from the classics to the modern period, was concerned with problems that, given the conceptual unity of economic analysis, could be informed by modern economics. The past should be written for economists from the perspective of modern economics. The past was prelude, and the present analyses grew from the older analyses. The implication was clear: to write about past economic thought, one had to present those ideas in modern dress, and to appraise past work, one had to judge it on its merits as good economic analysis as we today know it. Blaug later characterized this mind set as "No History Please, We're Economists" (2001) .
In the new volume Paul Samuelson on the History on Economic Analysis: Selected
Essays, edited by Steven G. Medema and Anthony M. C. Waterman (2015), Samuelson's 1987 essay appears as the first selection immediately following the editors' Introduction. His 1987 call to action, and the editors' general introduction to the seventeen selected papers, raises complex questions that historians of contemporary economics have mostly sought to avoid. In what follows, I will eschew avoidance and raise a set of questions that may serve to reinvigorate what has become a tiresome series of laments about, and defenses of, the history of economics.
Searches of Google Scholar and JSTOR suggest that citations to Samuelson's 1987 piece occur from time to time, but there has been little recent engagement with its primary argument.
Samuelson, whom I believe to be the most important American economist of the twentieth century, needs no defense of either his intellectual acuity or activity. He wrote on topics directly and indirectly associated with the history of economics over his entire career and as the editors point out, "Nearly 140 articles, essays, or memoirs listed at the end of [our] volume appearing over a period of forty-four years from 1946 to 2009 and comprising perhaps 20 percent of his scholarly publications, are clearly identifiable as studies of the history of economic thought." I doubt that many self-identified historians of economics have a publication record as long and varied. The authors' introduction offers an appraisal of Samuelson's work in the area. One paragraph gives what, to this reader, is the central point to keep in mind when reading these seventeen papers by Samuelson. Though it is long, I will quote it in full because it raises most of the questions that the rest of my essay seeks to answer.
Samuelson occupies a controversial place among historians of economics. Because of his vision of the conceptual unity of all economic analysis, his historiographic method when reaching deep into the past was to formalize the analysis of his predecessors (and he saw them as such) using modern mathematical tools and theoretical constructs. Contextual elements such as historical background, influences, and ideology -important to most other historians -were ruthlessly ignored. When we move closer to the present, however, and witness Samuelson analyzing the work of contemporaries and near-contemporaries through what he described as a historical lens, we see a different approach, one that brings in the role of personalities, context, and scholarly communities in the creation of path breaking ideas -that is, invoking elements of history that, as we shall see in this volume, he tended to dismiss in certain of his commentaries on writing the history of the economics of the distant past. (5) This "formalization of the analysis of his predecessors" is central to most of the discussions of Samuelson's work in the history of thought. Samuelson himself, as the editors note, defended this approach by identifying it as "Whig History of Economic Science." This is Samuelson the neologist who coined "the Neoclassical Synthesis", "the Correspondence Principle", "the Theory of Revealed Preference" and so on. However his deployment of Herbert Butterfield's book The Whig Interpretation of History (1965 History ( [1931 ) shows a remarkable lack of understanding of Butterfield. That distinguished historian was arguing that a political history was Whiggish if its organizing narrative structure showed that the moves of the various historical actors, their actions, and events represented progress or progressive moves. Progressive moves were characterized as presentist, projecting our present ideas back into the past and there finding "precursors", "antecedents" and the like. A Whig history was a history of progress. This, Butterfield argued, was misleading. He explained that Real historical understanding is not achieved by the subordination of the past to the present, but rather by making the past our present and attempting to see life with the eyes of another century than our own (16).
And he concluded his short book by reminding us that
[The] truth of history is no simple matter, all packed and parcelled and ready for handling in the marketplace. And the understanding of the past is not so easy as it is sometimes made to appear (132).
Samuelson argued for the conceptual unity of economics, so that the same conceptual There are always aspects of economic life that are left out of any simplified model. There will therefore be problems on which it throws no light at all; worse yet, there may be problems on which it appears to throw light, but on which it actually propagates error.
It is sometimes difficult to tell one kind of situation from the other.
All anyone can do is to try honestly to limit the use of the parable to the domain in which it is not actually misleading, and that is not always knowable in advance (Solow 1970, 2) .
What Samuelson was doing in his studies of classical authors was precisely this: he was using their texts to construct simple models that appeared tractable and could be mapped back onto some small element of the authors' interest. Samuelson was not doing Whig history. Samuelson was performing economic analysis. Using Butterfield's framework, the history of science as most all scientists see it is a story of movement from darkness to light, from ignorance to knowledge. It is a story of progress. As scientists talk science among themselves, and as they seek to control public discussions of scientific work, they behave Whiggishly. Believing as they do that their job is build on past work, to create new knowledge, scientists are socialized to think Whiggishly when they function as scientists. Since the early 1940s, when mainstream economists began to see themselves as doing "economic science" instead of "political economy", their working mind set has been similarly Whiggish. But the history of science is not preformed in science departments. So too the history of economic science is not preformed much, if at all, in North American economics departments. This fact is a necessary and irreversible result of economics becoming a serious science. Despite the protestations of those who bemoan the scientific turn, despite the complaints of non-mainstream economists about the wrong turns of the discipline, economics will not revert to its earlier practices.
"Whig history" is a monumental distraction. The phrase's use compels readers to believe that Samuelson was writing some sort of history. He was doing nothing of the kind. It was a manifestation of Samuelson's own remarkable ability to "see" simple and tractable models in the works of older economists just as he saw simple and tractable problems in discussions of both economists and our economic life. Such "seeing" was remarkable, and Nobel-worthy. That he enjoyed such work is indisputable. It allowed him to engage with a large number of scholars who were not fellows of the Econometric Society. Biographical studies currently emerging (Backhouse, to appear) show that he was a joyful conversationalist, and we have the evidence of his voluminous correspondence to show exactly how he engaged scholars of all sorts. Looking at older texts enabled him to extend his reach and his networks. This was reasonable behavior for an individual who was trained in the 1930s at the University of Chicago, a place where the great books had taken root. The history of science is well-established. ISIS, the journal of the History of Science Society, was founded by George Sarton in 1924, and books on its historiography of science (e.g. Kuhn 1962; Kragh 1987; Golinski 1998 ) are well known. Many historians of economics know earlier figures represented a "call to arms". But it was only into the 1940s that the army was actually raised.
that the history of science was revolutionized in the 1970s and 80s by "science studies" which intertwined the history of science with the sociology of scientific knowledge. The emergent epistemological turn questioned the earlier assumptions about how science "worked". That literature is too immense to discuss here (although Golinski (1998) The difficulty is that many historians of economics do not seem to understand the difference between contemporary economics and pre-World War II economics. Writing the history of pre-World War II economics often involves reading and interpreting texts, books in the canon, arguments made by members of particular schools of thought, and so on. Once economics developed its own professionalized scientific discourse, its own rhetorical strategies, the actual written productions of economists became more formulaic. It is one thing to look askance at the standard set of instructions given to today's economics graduate students about how to construct a publishable paper, but it is another thing to take the published papers that result and treat them as informative historical documents open to conflicting interpretations.
Reading Debreu's Theory of Value the way one reads The Wealth of Nations may be interesting as a study in style and rhetoric, but it reveals nothing of its history to its reader (Düppe 2012; Düppe and Weintraub, 2014) . In contrast Keynes's General Theory intertwined its analysis with discussion of the historical circumstances that produced it. The same cannot be said about Medema and Waterman engage this problem only indirectly. In my view though it is the centerpiece of their volume. That is, they argue quite directly that when Samuelson wrote about more contemporary economics, he became much less formal in his treatments. What they show is that he wrote memoirs, autobiographical bits, obituaries, reminiscences, recollections, tributes, and evocations of place in many different circumstances. The editors assert that these pieces are rightly considered to be contributions to "the history of economics". I believe they are nothing of the sort. These are the raw materials of history comparable to Samuelson's performing his own oral history of, say, the University of Chicago in the 1930s.
As autobiographical accounts, recollections of encounters with those whom he is writing about, Samuelson of course is no more trustworthy than any eyewitness. Often we historians can use such memorials as the raw materials in constructing histories, even though they need to be checked against other materials that may or may not conform to them (Weintraub 2005 ). An excellent example of this is Samuelson's own recollections (1998) about the difficulties he faced in getting The Foundations of Economic Analysis into print. We now know (Backhouse 2015) that he misremembered the print run of the book, the time sequence of events leading to publication of the book, and what happened to the plates for the book after publication. Framing historical questions and providing tentative answers in a coherent narrative is the job of the historian of contemporary economics. These are not problems that can be addressed in the same way that an historian might address disparate interpretations of Ricardo's "On Machinery".
Economists, or historians of economics, appear to be unaware that there are very For a short period of time there were some works in the history of economics that engaged the new history of science (e.g. Mirowski 1989 Mirowski , 2002 Weintraub 1991 Weintraub , 2002 Sent 1998) . While this work was widely praised, it was not widely imitated. It is still the case that many historians' studies of the contemporary period appear to be, as Bruno Latour once noted, "legends of the saints". The cascade of interviews of the Nobel laureates, the possible future laureates and important economists, and so on suggest that the kind of writing that Samuelson did about contemporary economists is and will remain paradigmatic for economists constructing their own historical legacy. 
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